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Management of actions and interest groups has historically been sovereign’s existentialist 
imperative. The paper revitalizes philosophical state autonomy debate and then narrows down 
its focus to capture extractive antics of as erratic a state as Pakistan. A typology of factions – 
captioned as Elites – operative in extractive realm of Pakistan is developed to round them in 
theory, identify their properties, and lay bare mechanics of intra-elite and elite-non-elite 
transactions. The paper seminally develops the rational actor dilemma confronting Pakistani 
elites and identifies the modes through which the dilemma plausibly resolves itself. The 
transactional engagement between Pakistan’s internal and external rational actors is dissected 
to theorize that Pakistan essentially is an equilibrium consensus subsistence state thereby 
opening up vast vistas for future research. The paper concludes with the glum finding that 
Pakistan in its current essence and manifestation is fundamentally a captive state – beholden to 
elites of Pakistan. 
JEL Classification: H1 
Keywords: State Autonomy; Elite Capture; Pakistan’s Tax System; Pakistani 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most perennial questions that all regime types have historically 
encountered is the management of factions—that is, their expectations, interests, 
interplay, and ambitions—operating in the polity. In spite of the fact that factions and 
interest groups have always been extant in all states—totalitarian or democratic—at the 
other end of the interaction between the government and the governed—yet at a 
theoretical-philosophical level their operation and even presence has mostly been 
discounted. Rousseau found interest articulation by factions “as inimical to the general 
will.”
2
 Although Madison reckoned factions to be the supporters of liberty, yet viewed 
the ones “actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest” as a threat to the 
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“permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”
3
 In fact, factions and interest 
groups have found little sympathy in democratic traditions of all shades and hues. In the 
U.S., for instance, many States had laws in place prescribing fines and penalties on 
lobbying activities. Likewise, and understandably so, totalitarian regimes have tended to 
deny factions any right to collective interest articulation and autonomous action,
4
 though 
Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution specifically affirmed citizenry’s right to form 
groups and alliances with common goals. Factions “represent the interest of the sections 
into which a society divides,”
5
 but they must be able to articulate those interests and 
make an effort to pursue them by aligning and engaging themselves with the political 
process. Once it is decided that it is the factions with stakes in political bargaining and 
having both the will and the capacity to go in pursuit of their stakes belong to the 
universe that has interchangeably been captioned as “power elite,” “elite(s),”
6
 “pressure 
groups,” “lobbies,” “interest groups,” and “power groups,” etc.
7
 
Notwithstanding a pronounced dislike for their very existence and a socio-legal 
sanction of their operations, factions could be taken to perform important role towards 
socio-political development of states. It has convincingly been argued that factions—in 
the form of non-voluntary and obligatory collectivisms of controlled polities or voluntary 
formations of democratic dispensations—do facilitate identification of the individual with 
the political system; such identification being critically important towards state-building 
and cementing state-society relations. “In the nexus between economic, social and 
political power, interest groups translate economic power into social power and share 
with parties the function of transforming social power into political decisions.”
8
 Factions, 
at least theoretically, are expected to articulate to the regime apparatus, demands of a 
purportedly homogeneous clientele, which political parties then aggregate, consume, and 
transform into public policy outputs. Since factions, under normal circumstances, 
generate demands on existing politico-governance structures, and are, therefore, bound 
by rules of the game set by the system, in actuality pressure and power move in cadence. 
Although pressure—“continuation of bargaining by other means—denotes only one form 
of influence.”
9
 Contrarily, the density level of group activity could be taken for a reliable 
barometer of bargaining pressure on a political system at a given point in time.
10
  
Now, until factions or groups continue to articulate their interests to state 
apparatus—being subsidiary and external to state apparatus, policy outputs are likely to 
be those of an autonomous state.  However, as soon as factions pitch up their articulation 
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effort—either out of frustration of gaining less than their expectations or out of their 
expectation to gain more than what they have gained or are set to gain through set 
patterns of articulation—and infiltrate into or make an attempt to infiltrate into state 
apparatus itself—the scenario is dubbed as state captivity or elite capture. This study is 
an attempt to lay bare and explore into these competing concepts of autonomy and 
capture within the spatial dimension of the state of Pakistan. In between these opposing 
pulls of state autonomy and state captivity, stands Elites Ltd—a convenient conceptual-
cum-operational vehicle of loosely organised interest groups—to dissect Pakistan’s 
extractive function
11
 with a view to answering the cardinal question as to why Pakistan’s 
extractive function has adjusted to historically embedded low performance levels. 
The paper is divided into VI sections each one dealing with a different dimension 
of the subject. After introduction in Section I, Sections II and III deal with theory and 
literature review on power and state autonomy, and elites, respectively. While Section IV 
propounds and attempts to resolve rational actor dilemma with regard to the state of 
Pakistan, Section V extends the rational actor framework to the international stakeholders 
as external rational actors and seminally argues that sustained intense engagement 
between internal and external stakeholders on who picks and how much of the total cost 
of keeping Pakistani state afloat is essentially what renders Pakistan an equilibrium 
consensus subsistence state. Section VI concludes the discussion.  
 
II.  STATE AUTONOMY 
In spite of the fact that, though in a negative connotation, the question of faction 
management has historically found place in most literature on political philosophy 
starting with Aristotle,
12
 its corresponding term “state autonomy” made into the lexicon 
of the discipline relatively recently. A consensus appears to be emerging on Nicos 
Poulantzas
13
 for coining the expression “state autonomy” in 1960s,
14
 developing its 
formulation that has remained at the centre of all relevant debate over the past half 
century—including its various dimensions, e.g. “‘relative’ autonomy of the state.”
15
 
State autonomy could operationally imply a given state’s “ability to act and 
formulate interests of its own independently of and even against dominant groups 
(classes) and societal interests.”
16
 It thus follows that a state whose throw up in terms of 
policy formulation is larger than the sum of all interest group demand articulations could 
be dubbed an autonomous state. Contrarily, if a state’s aggregate policy outputs over a 
period of time are equal to or are less than the sum of polity’s interest group demand 
 
11Although the terms “extraction” and “extractive” have been used to denote state's total resource 
generation processes yet the major concern of the paper remains the study of the tax system and its various 
underlying socio-political triggers and dynamics. 
12See, in particular, Chapter V and VI, Aristotle, T. Sinclair, and T. J. Saunders, The Politics (New 
York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1981). 
13See, for instance, N. Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” New Left Review 58 (1969); Nicos 
Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class (London: New Left Books, 1973); N. Poulantzas, The Crisis of 
Dictatorships (London: New Left Books, 1976); State, Power, and Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978). 
14The entire debate on state autonomy in this paper and mostly elsewhere, too, is with reference to 
capitalist state alone. 
15Ralph Miliband, “State Power and Class Interests,” New Left Review, No. 138 (1983). 
16Diamantino P. Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova,”  
http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~machadod/autonomy.html. 
130 Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed 
 
articulations, it could be referred to as an un-autonomous or a captive state—shorn of all 
additives, a state in elite capture.
17
 A state could further be classified as a relatively 
autonomous or captive state depending on the size and significance of various variables 
extant in the equation. Scholars have leveraged the state autonomy analytical framework 
to interpret the behaviour, composition and character of all types of states— totalitarian, 
democratic, hybrid, peripheral or dependent states. 
A very important debate is, whether one could answer the critical question of a 
state’s autonomy merely by dint of its ability to formulate policies independent of the 
influence of polity’s legitimate classes and interest groups (neutral policy formulation), 
that is, without gauging its ability to implement its policies independent of the influence 
of classes and interest groups (neutral policy implementation).
18
 This is simply because 
even a most neutrally formulated policy, if hijacked by factions and thus not neutrally 
implemented, will come to a naught or end up achieving sub-optimal outcomes. Like in 
Pakistan, where Elites Ltd, in addition to rigging policy formulation process thereby 
compelling the state to deliver below-par policy outputs, decisively ventures to infiltrate 
into and manipulate state’s policy implementation apparatus, too—again forcing it to 
deliver below par policy outcomes. The paper posits that a state’s ability to neutrally 
implement its policies is an equally important variable in the equation.  
 
Problem of Power 
The problem of state autonomy, essentially boils down to as to who exercises 
power in the decision-making processes and structures of the state. A significant amount 
of scholarship has been created on the concept of power and its plausible facets and 
dimensions. The foremost and simplest dimension of power is best derived from Dahl’s 
illustrative definition: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do.”
19
 This particular dimension of power may 
manifest itself through physical restraint, persuasion, inducement, commitment 
activation, and coercion,
20
 and does imply latent conflict of interests between the parties 
concerned.
21
 Bachrach and Baratz tended to broaden Dahl’s rather simpler configuration 
of power and suggested to include the confining of “the scope of decision-making to 
relatively ‘safe’ issues,” into the concept of power and its exercise.
22
 While disagreeing 
 
17The terms “outputs” and “outcomes” have been interchangeably used in the literature. However, for clarity's 
sake, the paper uses the term “outputs” with reference to policy formulation process, and the term “outcomes” with 
reference to policy implementation process, and assumes that conversion of outputs into outcomes could be a function 
of various complex and intricate variables and their interplay, and that although measurement and quantification of 
''outputs” could be easier and simpler than that of “'outcomes,” yet both of the concepts connote different phenomena 
which justifies their parallel use depending on contextual requirements. 
18At certain level, this might appear to be a question of state capacity rather than that of state autonomy, but 
this is an imporant concept in the context of the theoretical framework being developed in that the paper posits that 
even if a particular policy gets formulated neutrally of the influence of the eltistist juggernaut, it could still be tinkered 
with by the elites through the generalist bureaucratic machine, at the implementation stage. 
19Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, No. 3 (1957): 203. 
20Brian Barry, “Power: An Economic Analysis,” in Democracy, Power, and Justice: Essays in Political 
Theory, ed. Brian Barry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 223. 
21Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basinstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 172. 
22Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review 
56, No. 4 (1962): 948. 
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with Dahl’s definition of a key political issue that it “should involve actual disagreement 
in preferences among two or more groups,”
23
 Bachrach and Baratz strongly argued that 
this was not good enough a conceptualisation of a key issue because people could 
disagree on all types of issues—important and unimportant,
24
 and that a real important 
issue would be the one that challenged the predominant values,
25
 and it were these kinds 
of issues that the dominant actor would be attempting to keep off the agenda.
26
 
Lukes, in turn, criticised Bachrach and Baratz and suggested that agenda-setting, 
which, in fact, was nothing more than a system of bias, was sustained by an underlying socio-
cultural environment and not by a sequence of individual acts, which would render a group 
susceptible to the systemic effects of mobilisation of bias primarily stemming from the form 
of the organisation.
27
 Lukes believed although power was all about observable conflicts yet all 
power might not involve observable conflicts. He also posited the power need not be 
exercised only in situations of conflict since the dominant player could exercise power on the 
weaker player through reshaping of the latter’s set of wants,
28
 which entailed a semantic 
control of some order as a natural corollary in terms of suspension of belief of the wronged 
that he was entitled to have a legitimate grievance.
29
 Thus, Lukes comes up with a third 
dimension of power, “which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those 
exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude.”
30
 It follows that actual conflict 
could be pushed to the sub-surface if power were exploited to blind a weaker player from 
being able to see his real interests. “Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have,” Lukes argues, “that is to secure 
their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires.”
31
 
Peter Digeser, exploiting Michel Foucault’s conceptual framework, comes up with 
the fourth dimension of power and contends that “the nature of obligation, the capacity of 
individuals to act freely … all of our political, economic, legal, and religious practices are 
planted in a social context governed by various rules and discourses forged by relations 
of power.”
32
 Digeser believes that the pre-existing socio-cultural facts including legal-
cum-governance milieu facilitates exercise of power by the dominant group on the 
weaker one in a subtle and pre-ordained manner. Although, academically significant yet 
contextually less important is the typology of power developed by French and Raven, 
which includes five bases of power, namely, reward, coercion, legitimate, expert and 
referent.
33
 Subsequently, Raven added ‘informational power’ to the model to make it 
stand on six bases.
34
 Etzioni focuses is on the study and exercise of power through the 
 
23Robert A. Dahl, “A Critique of the Rule Elite Model,” ibid. 52, No. 2 (1958): 467. 
24Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” ibid. 56, No. 4 (1962): 950. 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid. 





32Peter Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power,” The Journal of Politics 54, No. 4 (1992): 981. 
33J. R. P. French and B. H. Raven (ed.) “The Bases of Social Power,” in Group Dynamics, D. 
Cartwright and A. Zander (New York: Harper and Row, 1959). 
34B. H. Raven, “Social Influence and Power,” in Current Studies in Social Psychology, ed. I. D. Steiner 
and M. Fishbein (New York: Holt, Rinehard, Winston, 1965). 
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vehicle of the organisation to famously herald that “we are born in organisations, 
educated by organisations, and most of us spend much of our lives working for 
organisations.”
35
 Etzioni classifies organisations by the type of power they use to direct 
the behaviour of their members and the type of involvement of their people, and goes on 
to identify three types of organisational power: coercive, utilitarian and normative, and 
relates these to three types of involvement: alternative, calculative, and moral.”
36
 
Etzioni’s influence on the scholarship on organisation remains formidable. 
Parsons, after dilating upon various dimensions of power, settles on the basic 
consensus view of power as having to do with the ability of people or social groups 
(“collectivities”) “to get things done”—especially when there is some type of 
resistance present.
37
 He looks to examine power within the context of societies with 
special attention being paid to the role that coercive measures can play in relation to 
“the voluntary and consensual aspects of power systems.” By juxtaposing money in an 
economic system to the use of power in a political system, Parsons shows similarities 
and dissimilarities in the use of both in the “collectivities.” Parsons finds problems 
with the existing literature majorly in three areas. One, he rejects the view that power is 
simply the “generalised capacity to attain ends or goals in social relations, 
independently of the media employed or of the status of ‘authorisation’ to make 
decision or impose obligations.” On the contrary, Parsons argues that power requires to 
be understood as a “specific mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action 
of other units, individual or collective, in the process of social interaction.”
38
 Two, 
picking on the theorists who view power only in terms of being coercive or consensual, 
Parsons argues that, in fact, both attributes are ‘essential’ to the concept of political 
power and that they could not be viewed independent of each other. “It is both,” 
Parsons held, “precisely because it is a phenomenon which integrates a plurality of 
factors and outputs of political effectiveness and is not to be identified with any one of 
them.”
39
 Three, Parsons fell out with his peers on power for their almost linear belief 
that the imposing of power resulted in a zero-sum outcome, and that any increase in 
power of one necessarily means a decrease in the power of the other. Parsons, on the 
contrary believed that a zero-sum outcome was possible and it often occurred too, but it 
was just not always the case. 
It would be seen that, in the case of Pakistan, exercise of power by the oligarchs on 
the citizenry occurs through a variety of ways ranging from the most naked i.e. direct 
coercion to the most subtle i.e. agenda-manipulation and semantic occupation. The debate 
on the complexities of power and the ways in which it was exercised, would underpin and 
illuminate an extensive survey of the wide-ranging literature on state autonomy in the 
broader realm of political economy created over the past half century, which can be 
analysed and reviewed by dividing and classifying into two competing strands: (a) 
society-centric strand; and (b) state-centric strand. 
 
35A. Etzioni, A Comprehensive Analysis of Complex Organisations (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
36Fred C. Lunengburg, “Compliance Theory and Organisational Effectiveness. “ International Journal 
of Scholarly Academic Intellectual Diversity 14, No. 1 (2012). 
37Tallcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Political Power,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 107, No. 3 (1963). 
38Ibid., 232. 
39Ibid., 258. 
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(a)  Society-centric Strand 
For society-centric theorists, the starting point of inquiry in comprehending the 
state and its conduct is the understanding of social functions underlying it. Thus, the 
proper explanatory direction, society-centric thinkers believe, is from the society to the 
state. “Thus, the analysis of the forms of the capitalist state can only be made when the 
causal necessity of the emergence and existence of the state, and its organisational 
apparatus, derives from the nexus of individual relationships (liberal state theory, 
pluralism) or the nexus of class relationships (Marxian state theory).”
40
 Marx believed 
that “forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves...but rather have their roots 
in the material conditions of life...,” and that “anatomy of civil society is to be sought in 
political economy.”
41
 Engels, too, thinks that “state is…by no means a power forced on 
society from without...rather it is a product of society at a certain stage of 
development…this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it...is the 
state.”
42
 Then both thinkers collaboratively took the position that “only political 
superstition today imagines that social life must be held together by the state, whereas in 
reality the state is held together by civil life.”
43
 
To them and their intellectual progeny (neo-Marxists), the state is nothing more 
than an extension of civil society, and a self-propelled process, which reproduces 
normative social order exclusively geared to protect particular and not general interests 
and maintain the status quo. It has, therefore, been argued that for Marx, Engels and their 
followers to a good extent “state and its bureaucratic organisation constitute ‘parasitic’ 
entities.”
44
 Thus, the capitalist state, irrespective of the level of economic development of 
its underlying society, professes unto itself, as its raison d’être, the protection of 
particular interests of the capital-owning class, and is given to maintaining “general 
conditions for the reproduction of the wage labour/capital relation which is at the heart of 
bourgeois societies.”
45
 The ontological primacy, which the duo—Marx and Engels— 
appears associating to civil society, leads them to further theorise that “capitalist state is, 
and can only be, relatively autonomous.”
46
 
In fact, this very Marxian position, that the capitalist state is nothing more than a 
bourgeoisie tool tailor-made and unleashed to dominate the proletariat and advance the 
bourgeois class interests, has tended to develop a subsidiary view i.e. relative state 
autonomy. Marx, illustratively talking about the Second French Empire remarked that “in 
reality, it was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had 
already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the 
nation.”
47
 Engels, echoing Marx, also observed that “by way of exception, however, 
 
40Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova”. 
41K. Marx, Preface to a Critique of Political Economy (London: Electric Books, 2001). 
42Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: New 
International Publishers, 1972). 
43K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002). 
44D. Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989), 39. 
45Ronaldo Munck, Politics and Dependency in the Third World: The Case of Latin America (London: 
Zed Books, 1984), 206. 
46Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova” 2. 
47K. Marx and L.H. Simon, Marx: Selected Writings (Hackett, 1994), 304. 
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periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state 
power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of 
independence of both,” and that such “was the Bonapartism of the First, and still more of 
the Second French Empire, which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and 
the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.”
48
 Thus, while both Marx and Engels posit that all 
capitalist states continue to remain class states in essential composition and character, 
they might starkly differ in degree and level of autonomy.
49
 
Subsequent thinkers could be classified into two separate streams of scholarship, 
that is, the Instrumentalists and the Structuralists. Neo-Marxists, who agree on the basic 
premise that capitalist state is nothing more than a tool at the command of capital-owning 
classes tasked to promoting and advancing their politico-economic agenda, but differs in 
the ways it achieves its objectives, are loosely dubbed as Instrumentalists. The substantial 
amount of Instrumentalist knowledge created during the second half of the twentieth 
century, is dedicated to exploring various ways through which the institution of the state 
can be leveraged, by capital-owing classes, to maintain and maximise the economic status 
quo.
50
 The Instrumentalists, broadly speaking, take the position that the state, in effect, is 
an “instrument for the domination of society,”
51
 which seeks to perform its avowed 
functions in deliberate subservience to the “instrumental exercise of power by people in 
strategic positions.” When such strategically placed people exploit the state structure 
directly, the scenario is referred to as direct instrumentality; and when they exert pressure 
on the polity indirectly, the scenario is dubbed as indirect instrumentality.
52
 But in either 
case, the overarching objective of state exploitation remains the optimisation of the 
capitalist class’s interests. Instrumentalists further contend that in order for the capitalist 
state to promote capital-owning class’s interest, it has to be relatively autonomous. “Its 
relative independence makes it possible for the state to play its class role in an 
approximately flexible manner.  If it really was the simple ‘instrument’ of the ‘ruling 
class’, it would be fatally inhibited in the performance of its role.  Its agents absolutely 
need a measure of freedom in deciding how best to serve the existing social order.”
53
 It 
has been remarked that within the Marxist school of thought there are “a variety of 




48Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, 160-61. 
49Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova” 3. 
50See, for instance, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Winfield and Nelson, 
1969); “The Capitalist State—Reply to Poulantzas,” New Left Review, No. 59 (1970); “Poulantzas and the 
Capitalist State,” New Left Review, No. 82 (1973); Marxism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977); Class Power and State Power (London: Verso, 1983); W. Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983); G. William Domhoff and Thomas R. Dye, Power Elites and 
Organisations (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987); W. Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State 
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990); M. Useem, “The Social Organisation of the American Business Elite and 
Participation of Corporate Directors in the Governance of American Institutions,” American Sociological 
Review, no. 44 (1979); The Inner Circle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); D. A. Gold, “Recent 
Developments in Marxist Theory of the State,” Monthly Review 27, No. 5 (1975); “Recent Developments in 
Marxist Theory of the State,” Monthly Review 27, No. 6 (1975). 
51Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, 22. 
52Gold, “Recent Developments in Marxist Theory of the State.” 
53Miliband, Marxism and Politics, 87. 
54B. Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Method (New York: New York University 
Press, 1982), xii. 





 who assert that it is not possible to understand state and its conduct 
through “behaviorist/empiricist observations of instrumental exercise of power by the 
ruling class, because the class composition of those running the state apparatuses is of no 
importance to the nature of the state in capitalist societies,”
56
 are referred to as 
Structuralists. Contrarily, Structuralists argue that “it is the structure of these societies 
that makes the state serve the capitalist class that is causal significant.”
57
 Poulantzas 
suggests that both social class and the state are “objective structures,” and their interplay 
and mutual relationship ought to be “taken as an objective system of regular 
connections.”
58
 He avers that since the state is essentially a product and outcome of 
interactions, it must intrinsically and essentially be a “condensation of class-based 
relations.”
59
 Furthermore, since the state is reflective of objective power structures, it 
cannot be taken to be autonomous; it can be taken to be relatively autonomous only—
perhaps, to the extent that the state is not able to broker deals and come up with the win-
win (intra-class) inter-group bargains and has to assume the role of the final arbiter of 
disputes and power. Thus, the relative autonomy of the state would be equal to the 
capacity it obtains to operate autonomously of the capitalist class while continuing to be 
essentially a capitalist state. Althusser, leading proponent of French Strucutralist Neo-
Marxism, argued that it was a cardinal mistake to read Marxism in terms of historicism, 
idealism, economism or even phenomenological Marxism. He explained that this mistake 
was being made by Marxian interpreters’ who were caught in “pre-historic humanistic 
ideology” and were obsessed with his early works. Instead, Althusser stressed that Marx 
presented an outright epistemological break with the pre-existing scholarship traditions, 
and that his work bordered on science.
60
  Kolakowski came down hard on Althusser 





(b)  State-centric Strand 
The state-centric strand scholars argue that the state is an entity whose action bits 
constitute the primary unit of analysis for any further inquiry. The causal direction, 
according to state-centric strand scholars, is from the state structure to the society, and 
not the other way round. “To state-centred theorists the state is at the same time 
embedded in the structural relations of capitalistic social formation, and an independent 
organisation which has a monopoly on coercive power, and a life and form of its own.”
62
 
Amongst the state-centric theorists, Weber is the first one to argue that states “are 




55Neo-Marxist Structuralists e.g. Poulantzas develop a Marxist theory of the capitlist state from the 
logic of capitalism—using Althusser's strucutralist epistimology. 
56Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova”. 
57Ibid. 
58Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State.” 
59Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class. 
60Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 2005). 
61Leszek Kolakowski, “Althusser's Marx,” Socialist Register  (1971). 
62Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova” 4. 
63Cited in Dietrich Rueschemeyer Peter B. Evans, Theda Skocpol,, ed. Bringing the State Back In 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 7. 
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Weber and his disciples,
64
 firmly suggest that the state can pursue objectives or targets, 
which do not, necessarily, echo the demand articulations of power-wielding factions 
vying to maximise their gains in the state. In a clear-cut departure from Marxists and 
Neo-Marxists, Weber was not able to agree to the notion that the state was “parasitic” in 
its very nature and properties, and a “direct product of the activities of classes.” The 




In a Weberian vein, Block takes an outright position that the institution of the 
state does not possess the property of reducibility to mere class interests and struggles, 
and avers that “State power is sui generis, not reducible to class power,” and that “each 
social formation determines that particular way in which state power will be exercised 
within that society.”
66
 Block brings in a new theoretical construct, “state managers,” 
and argues that the state managers “are individuals not involved in the relations of 
production and are, therefore, independent from the capitalist class, even if they were 
proper members of that class before they became state managers.”
67
  The “State 
managers” appears to be Block’s answer to the question of “relative state autonomy,” 
which he finds to be “a slightly more sophisticated version of the instrumental view it 
attacks.”
68
 Block’s disambiguation helps convincingly argue that since the “state 
managers”—whose primary mandate is to facilitate contract enforcement, provide 
enabling environment, keep “business confidence,” and maintain law and order—get 
remunerated from the state exchequer and are governed by rules and regulations laid 
down by the state, and therefore, they cannot be taken as mechanical agents promoting 
class interests, nor “reduction of state power to class power implied in the qualification 
“relative” as a natural corollary.
69
 Thus, on the one hand, Block’s state is inherently 
organisationally autonomous of the ruling classes, and on the other, does function, on 
its own, to guarantee capital accumulation and maintain the all-important class 
domination. 
Skocpol’s contribution to the state autonomy project is rather a robust defense of 
the state as a “structural” organisation. She strongly believes that the state is essentially 
irreducible to inter-class relations or struggles; that the state, too, is an organisation with a 
persona capable of independent decision-making just like any other ordinary organisation 
with a structure, functional mechanisms, and having objectives to pursue.
70
  Skocpol 
castigates Marxists (and neo-Marxist Structuralists) for assuming that “states are 
inherently shaped by classes or class struggles” and exclusively given “to preserve and 
expand modes of production.”
71
 She also attacks them for making it “virtually impossible 
even to raise the possibility that fundamental conflicts of interest might arise between the 
existing dominant class, or set of groups on the one hand, and the state rulers on the 
 
64Also styled as “Neo-Weberians.” 
65Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy, 41. 
66Fred Block, “Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects,” in Socialist 
Register, ed. Ralph Miliband and J. Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1980), 229. 
67Machado, “On the Autonomy of the State and the Case of the Portuguse Estado Nova”. 
68Fred Block, “Beyond Corporate Liberalism,” Social Problems 24 (1977): 7. 
69“Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects,” 230. 
70This is the position which is also taken by Weber and Block. 
71Peter B. Evans, Bringing the State Back In, 4. 





 She critiqued Poulantzas’ approach as she found it very frustrating because he 
simply posited the “relative autonomy of the capitalist state” as an indispensable element 
and attribute of capitalist production mode.
73
 The state, Skocpol points out, is to be 
seen “as an organisation for itself.”
74
 She also takes to task “virtually all neo-Marxist 
writers of the state” for retaining “deeply embedded society-centered assumptions,”
75
 and 




While a substantial amount of literature has evolved on state autonomy and its 
various dimensions, hardly anything has been written on state captivity—a plausible 
antonym of state autonomy.
77
 May be it has just been assumed that mere absence of state 
autonomy is tantamount to state captivity; maybe not; maybe it is more than that, needing 
corresponding and independent theorisation. Nonetheless, the dissection of influence of 
factions on state or its conduct under Marxist, Neo-Marxist or even state-centric 
traditions, illuminates the succeeding debate in the particular context of Pakistan.    
 
III.  ELITE CAPTURE IN PAKISTAN 
Since C. Wright Mills published his path-breaking work “The Power Elite” in 
1956 to propound his thesis that America was in an effective control of the military, 
economic, and political elites,
78
 a large number of scholars have applied his analytical 
framework to examine politico-economic structures of a number of countries. Some 
expanded it to include certain other elite (groups) into the framework to fit a certain 
peculiar situation, and still others have channeled energies to prove him right or wrong. 
Mills argues “that these men of the Power Elite now occupy the strategic places in the 
structure of American society; that they command the dominant institutions of the 
dominant nation; that as a set of men, they are in a position to make decisions with 
terrible consequences for the underlying populations of the world.”
79
 
What are main features of the Millsian power elite? Broadly speaking Mills’ 
power elite are at the pinnacle of economic, military, and political institutions—more as 
types and functions than as individuals. Since their positions of power are 
interchangeable across domains, they do shuffle their positions that inevitably results in 
an institutionally-developed near-uniform worldview. They share a clear-cut “class 
consciousness” and a unique image of themselves as a social fact—regardless of their 
ostensible party affiliations and popularly ascribed ideological labelling, which 
effectively manifests itself in their  aggressive policy posturing as—they ruthlessly 
 
72Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russian and China 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 27. 
73Peter B. Evans, Bringing the State Back In, 33. 
74Theda Skocpol, “The Broken Wave,” Journal of Development Studies 15, No. 4 (1979): 27. 
75Peter B. Evans, Bringing the State Back In, 5-9. 
76R. F. Levine, “Bringing Class Back In: State Theory and Theories of the State,” in Recapturing 
Marxism, an Appraisal of Recent Trends in Sociological Theory, ed. R. F. Levine and J. Lembecke (New York: 
Praeger, 1987), 97. 
77On Pakistan, an academic dissertation, not of much significance though, has been attempted. See 
Oskar Verkaaik, “The Capitve State: Corruption, Intelligence Agencies, and Ethnicity in Pakistan,” ed. 
Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (2006). 
78C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
79Ibid., 286. 
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venture to pursue their goals at the cost of the underlying millions with impunity and, in 
fact, quite impersonally. The power elite do not necessarily hail from a common 
privileged origin. However, their selection, grooming and promotion through an 
institutionally evolved process, guarantees an identical worldview, regardless of the 
commonality of origin. The commonality of origin can under-write a completely uniform 
worldview as variances in the background, even if moulded by elitist institutional 
conditioning, can result in divergences in the worldview. There might be factions 
amongst power elite but their over-arching commonality of interests breeds an inner 
discipline that binds them together.
80
 Millsian power elite do not conspire in a 
coordinated fashion—not for any petty self-interest, but for dominant positions in the 
dominant institutional orders of the most dominant state in the world. Due to the fact that 
during the length of their careers at top positions, and that hardly any fundamental 
variation in overarching world vision is possible, they do what is expected and required 
of them to sustain integrity of the benefactor system. These traits, Mills thought, create a 
class of individuals who effectively controlled America—and by implication—the world. 
 
Pakistani Elites 
In order to expand the elitist model to explain the domination of Pakistan’s polity, 
economy, and extractive function, it needs to be seen if the elitist factor is at work in the 
first place? Hamza Alavi, was by far the first scholar of renown to have tried explaining 
the structural construction and mechanics of the state of Pakistan from the perspective of 
its oligarchical control.
81
 In a clear-cut departure from the traditional scholarship that 
argued that Pakistan’s creation was due to a movement for an independent state that was 
triggered and sustained by a religiously motivated passion, Alavi posited that it was, 
instead, led by salary-dependent class of Muslim government servants—“Salariat.”
82
 
Alavi thought that “Having seen a diminution in its share of jobs in pre-partition India, 
this “Salariat” saw that it stood to gain most from the creation of a new state.”
83
 Alavi 
developed his concept and built it on the premise that since (a) none of the dominant 
social classes in the post-colonial Pakistan were powerful enough to control the state; and 
(b) the bureaucratic-military complex brutally controlled its inner core and very 
operational mechanics, and hence, Pakistan was an “over-developed state.” Alavi 
influenced a whole generation of scholars and “has been the basis for countless 
formulations on the state—not always in agreement with Alavi—both in South Asia as 
well as other developing countries.”
84
 
Asaf Hussain, next in line, applied the elitist framework to analyse the power 
dynamics of the Pakistani politics. Hussain posits that “An analysis of the political 
structure of Pakistan can be approached from a number of perspectives, but it is from an 
approach to elitism that the greatest insights into this complex cultural system can be 
 
80Ibid., 283. 
81Hamza Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh “ New Left Review 1, 
No. 74 (1972). 
82“Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology,” in State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, 
ed. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (Hong Kong: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988). 
83Arif Azad, “Hamza Alavi,” The Guardian, December 19, 2003. 
84Asad Sayeed, “Hamza Alavi: An Obituary,” Herald, February 12, 2004. 
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gained,” and that “Such an approach encompasses the most significant political, social, 
and economic factors relevant to the state’s political development.”
85
 Hussain’s “primary 
focus is upon distinct elite groups extant in Pakistan, their institutional derivation, and, 
most importantly, the competition and conflict among them that has so completely 
dominated political development,”
86
 in Pakistan. His elites are engaged in an arduous 
struggle to first shape the state according to their ideological leanings resulting into a 
polity torn and fractured against itself. “Thus, the [Military Elites] ME was solely 
interested in rendering Pakistan a “praetorian state,” and [Bureaucratic Elites] BE an 
“administrative state,” the [Landowning Elites] LE a “feudal state,” the [Industrial Elites] 
IE a “bourgeoisie state,” the [Political Elites] PE a “democratic state,” and the [Religious 
Elites] RE an “Islamic state.” The net result of these diverse self-fulfilling political 
strategies was that the political elites and the state suffered from inadequate 
institutionalisation of infrastructures such as political parties. To worsen the situation, 
elites were alienated from masses, leaving political culture fragmented, not integrated.”
87
 
He concludes that in a praetorian system “only the strong survive” with each elite group 
using “any means available to maximise its power.”
88
 
Shafqat, using Flanagan’s model of crisis and structural change, designed in the 
broader framework of system’s paradigm, also attempted to explain the dynamics of 
Pakistan’s political system from 1947 till 1989.
89
 Flanagan’s model suggests that changes 
in the international environment and the performance of government generate systemic 
crisis which leads to structural change.
90
 In order to operationalise the model, Shafqat 
recognises “military, bureaucracy, industrial-merchant classes, political elites, and 
religious elites” as four structural components of Pakistan’s political system.
91
 Shafqat’s 
“model identifies four phases of crisis and change: (i) the antecedent system; (ii) 
environmental performance changes; (iii) coalition formation and crisis resolution; and 
(iv) developmental linkage and the resultant system,”
92
 and then detects certain 
mechanisms that “became a standard procedure of coalition formation and structural 
alternation in the political system of Pakistan” which “have been used by successive 
regimes to formulate a ruling coalition.”
93
 The identified mechanisms are: (a) selective 
co-option; (b) collateralisation; (c) containment; and (d) economic policies and changes 
in international environment.
94
 Shafqat believes that out of his elites “military, 
bureaucracy and industrial-merchant classes are structural components with greater 
“durability,” and therefore, these particular components exhibit “the propensity to impede 
 





89Saeed Shafqat, Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy : Essays in Interpretation (Lahore: 
Progressive Publishers, 1989). 
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the growth of the other relatively weak components,” and that “Whereas the weak 
components remain weak or decay, these components acquire greater strength over a 
period of time.”
95
 He dubs “these three components i.e. military, bureaucracy, and 
merchant-industrial classes…the parameters of Pakistan’s political system” since in “the 
ruling coalition making process, they emerge as the critical components,”
96
 and concludes 
that in societies “where structural imbalance does exist…relatively ‘durable,’ ‘structures’ 
reveal propensity to dominate the political system.”
97
 
The most significant attempt to interpret and analyse the structure and performance 
of Pakistan’s political economy has been Ishrat Husain’s “Pakistan: The Economy of an 
Elitist State.”
98
 This is an incisive attempt to explain Pakistan’s economic development 
during the first fifty years of its history, and to demonstrate that the benefits of whatever 
semblance of development that took place predominantly affected the elites of the 
country, while the majority of population remained unaffected. Husain situates Pakistan 
against “economic development of more than a hundred low-income countries struggling 
to improve the living standards of their population,”
99
 and draws out patterns of progress. 
He argues that the “record of development experience has been mixed,” and that a “very 
small group of countries has been able to achieve success in graduating from the ranks of 
poor countries within a generation.”
100
 Husain avers that there is another group of 
countries, which is quickly moving towards that end provided there are no major 
setbacks. Simultaneously, Husain goes on to posit that there still is a large number of 
countries that “have suffered reversals and are worse off today than they were at the time 
of their independence from colonial rule.”
101
 Finally, Husain hammers home the point 
that there are countries, “which are muddling through and moving forward with hiccups, 
but where the benefits of development are unevenly distributed and are highly 
concentrated in a small segment of the population.”
102
 He then moves on to explain the 




Husain broadly identifies five patterns of state-society interactions to grasp and 
explain the process of economic development in various countries and regions. Firstly, 
the one that remained popular during 1950s and 1960s revolved around the notion “that 
the state through a strong interventionist and directive role, using the instruments of 
central planning and big-push, state-led industrialisation, would break the low-level 
equilibrium trap of poverty in which developing countries were caught.”
104
 Secondly, the 
predatory state “guided by the narrow and selfish interests of those in power,” supplanted 
“a benign and benevolent state acting in the larger interests of the population,” as the 


















 Thirdly, in the wake of dissolution of the Soviet Union “‘Free enterprise’ 
and ‘deregulation’ became the new buzzwords” as “‘Government failure’ was found to be 
greater evil than ‘Market failure.’”
106
 Fourthly, the model of shared growth as 
successfully followed and exhibited by East Asian economies. Fifthly, Husain posits that 
in stark contrast to the model “of shared growth, there is an equally powerful model of 
elitist growth which characterises a number of developing countries.”
107
 According to 




What is the elitist growth model? Husain explains the elitist growth model in the 
following manner:  
“Under this model, there is a complete reversal of the traditional roles of the 
market and the state. Markets are normally associated with efficiency and are 
found to be impervious to the considerations of equity and distribution. The state is 
usually thought of in terms of ensuring equity and access to opportunities. But 
under an elitist model, where both economic and political power are held by a 
small coterie of elites, the market is rigged  and state is hijacked in order to deliver 
most of the benefits of economic growth to this small group. The markets therefore 
produce inefficient outcomes that are detrimental to the long-term sustainability of 




Husain then goes on to provide “an overview of the performance of the economy 
of Pakistan” as a whole and by dividing it in “five sub-periods which correspond to 
different economic and political eras,” he “lays down the production structure—mainly 
those of the agricultural and industrial sectors—and outlines the changes which have 
occurred” during Pakistan’s history, and “summarises the developments and outcomes in 
macroeconomic policies—Fiscal, Monetary, and Exchange rate; other complementary 
policies—Trade, Debt, and Investment” and other important areas like Human Capital, 
poverty, unemployment, Physical Capital, and finally “attempts to present a cogent 
political economy explanation of the paradoxes exhibited by the Pakistani economy” by 






It is argued that despite being a substantially meaningful contribution towards 
explaining the structure of Pakistan’s political economy, Husain’s model suffers from 
serious limitations and infirmities. While his model does explain monopolisation of the 
Infrastructure by Pakistani elites, it does not elitist Superstructure i.e. bureaucracy, 
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their agenda. How an economy which promised so much in the first half of its life 
spanning over six decades lost its way through the second? How the society at large has 
been semantically occupied, religiously opiated, socially alienated, economically rattled, 
and politically controlled, do not appear to be Husain’s concerns. His main preoccupation 
remains an overall data-based analysis and assessment of the economy from an 
economist’s perspective. There are more specific problems as well. The model highlights 
causal correlations between the variables, but falls short of identifying, establishing, and 
elaborating causal mechanisms at work in the correlations. How did the elites hijack the 
state? Do elites compete or cooperate amongst themselves? How are they able to sustain 
their domination on the state, polity and society over time? How do elites reap benefits of 
economic growth? How do they actually cause to rig public policy in different domains 
of economic life? Similarly, the main concepts and relationships have not been defined. 
Who are elites? Are elites an identifiable, clearly demarcated, and monolithic water-tight 
entity? How, when disaggregated, intra-elite transactions take place? What are the 
determinants of elite-non-elite relations? Furthermore, since Husain does not 
circumscribe and delimit his variables, they constantly mutate, and assume an amorphous 
character to fit the line, need and size of the argument, reducing it to a tautology. These 
and other gaps in the model necessitate development and extension upon Husain’s 
model—with primary objective of explaining elites’ domination of Pakistan’s economic 
system and its fall out for marginalised masses. Some scholars, in addition to Husain, 




Gaps in Research 
Since Alavi, Hussain, and Shafqat are predominantly political in approach and 
Husain offers insight into the elitist control of Pakistan economy’s productive function 
only, all of them appear a vast expanse of intellectual territory yet to be chartered. The 
paper thus makes a significant departure with Alavi, Hussain, Shafqat, and Husain, and 
builds upon them so as to purposely reduce focus from an outright control of the state 
(political power) or even the economy’s productive function by elites to primarily the 
control of its extractive function, and to further develop the theoretical framework by 
linking it with the superior intellectual debate centred around the state autonomy. 
The paper takes Pakistani elites as an eclectic conglomerate of vested interests that 
systematically cooperate and enter into non-zero-sum exchanges aimed at optimising 
group gains by mounting pressure on the state to exercise sub-optimal (fiscal) policy 
options. It further postulates that while the Pakistani elites enter into zero-sum exchanges 
with competing rival groups for political gains—the control of governance structures, 
they take a complete volte face to enter into non-zero-sum transactions for economic 
gains—(through) control of extractive function—with confrontation giving way to 
cooperation, exclusion to inclusion, and monopolisation to quid pro quos, which could 
 
111See, for example, Farhan Zainulabideen and Zafar Iqbal, “Taxation and Good Governance and the 
Influence of Non-Tax Revenues on a Polity” Policy Perspectives Volume 6, No. July–December (2009); S. 
Akbar Zaidi, “Pakistan's Roller-Coaster Economy: Tax Evasion Stifles Growth,” (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Policy Brief No. 88, 2010); M. Abdul Mateen Khan, “Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in 
Pakistan,” Lahore Journal of Economics 8, No. January-June 1 (2003); Kaiser Bengali, “Contradictory 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies,” Dawn, October 10, 2002. 
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either be immediate or deferred; articulated or understood; systematic or automatic.
112
 It 
would therefore, for good reason, be quite a misnomer to call Pakistani elites “elites.” 
However, for want of a better construct, these interest groups are referred to as elites—to 
be more precise, effective elites—in recognition of their inexorable effectiveness 
exhibited over time towards achievement of their not too hidden an agenda, maintenance 
and enhancement of the economic status quo. 
This over-arching conglomerate of Pakistani elites, it is argued, is fundamentally 
composed of: (i) industrial elite; (ii) business elite; (iii) religious elite; (iv) military elite; 
(v) feudal elite; and (vi) sundry (non-profit sector, media, judicial and professional) elite. 
Not recognising the politicians and the bureaucrats as separate elite groups on Pakistan’s 
power drawing board is a fundamental deviation from the traditional typologies. It is 
simply because the bureaucracy (primarily generalists) exists as a sine qua non in the 
ever-existing framework of the state which under-grids the ruling coalitions to help the 
latter rig the public policy formulation process and occupy the state and its extractive 
system. After playing an active lead role in governing the state during the first decade of 
her existence, since the imposition of martial law in 1958, the bureaucracy had opted to 
(or was forced to) play a back-end subordinate role—pre-dominantly subservient and 
non-Weberian in nature. The mere fact that the paper inducts the generalist mandarins 
into the model as proxies and not as rational actor per se, does not mean that they do not 
operate as rational actors; they do, but in a basely and pecuniary way, and in utter 
subservience to the ruling masters—not at par with them.
113
 Similarly, the political elite 
do not exist as a separate entity in the model. They are rather composed of representatives 
of one of the six elite groups the primary objective of whom is not to dominate power 
structures per se, but to intrude into them so as to maintain and enhance the economic 
status quo. While industrial, business, religious, military, and feudal elite may be 
common constructs in Pakistan’s public policy discourse, the so-called non-profit, media, 
judicial and professional elite are a new trigger in the polity who now exhibit good grit 
not only to rig public policy formulation, but also its implementation in their favour—like 
their pre-existing peer groups.
114
 The subtraction of mandarins and politicians from the 
traditional typologies of Pakistani elites is potentially a new vista for future reflection, 
research and debate. 
 
Properties of Pakistani Elites 
It is interesting to note that Pakistani elites do not possess and reflect, if not all, 
most of the properties of Millsian power elite. Pakistani elites neither necessarily reflect 
any “class consciousness,” nor any similarities of “origin,” nor are they driven by a lust 
for power to control and shape the world according to their own higher peculiar ideal 
worldview—with probably notable exception of the religious elite. They also do not want 
 
112Later in the study it will be delineated as to how the non-zero-sum transactions between the elites 
take place to control the tax policy formulation and enforcement of the fiscal codes. 
113For a further and detailed elaboration of this point, see Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan's 
Governance Goliath: The Case of Non-Professional Chairman, F.B.R,” Pakistan Development Review IV, No. 
72 (2016). 
114Hussain calls Feudal elites “Landowning elites”, and classifies Professional elites as “Emerging 
elites.” Shafqat clubs industrial and business elites under common rubric “Industrial-merchant class.” 
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to dominate the world in the sense of its being a manifestation of an a-priori human 
faculty of acquisitiveness, excellence, and an extreme urge to prevail. Instead, they are 
motivated and driven by mundane, at times, lowly group-centric economic ambitions. In 
order to pursue their economic agenda they do not form any permanent alliances nor do 
they enter into any ideological battle-grounds. They quickly shuffle and change their 
positions from moment to moment and on issue to issue frantically looking to optimise 
their economic gains ruthlessly—at all costs, and at all times. In Pakistan, economic 
group-interest is the only permanent and defining factor in the formation and deformation 
of elite alliances—including ruling coalitions. They want, neither to rule nor be ruled, if it 
could in any manner, potentially jeopardise the economic status quo. But Pakistani elites 
are effective to the kill, go-getters of the highest order, and top performers when it comes 
to achievement of their own agenda. They have, over time, exhibited tremendous efficacy 
to put together ruling alliances which could under-write the economico-political status 
quo; which would not pose taxing questions; which would guarantee provision of 
subsidies, exemptions, and a dysfunctional extractive system. Husain accentuates this 
point by stating that the “hold of a narrow, self-centred elite on the economy … is much 
stronger than in some other countries in the region.”
115
 Their focus and limited objectives 
(above-par economic gains) have earned them unparalleled success. Mumtaz, et al. 
provide interesting insight into inter-elite struggles and tactical ploys: “Given these 
proclivities of the business elite, the smaller scale and informal sectors have, in turn, 
responded to secure their own segmented territories. They have exploited institutional 
weaknesses by resisting documentation, and regulatory provisions, and even more 
tellingly by successfully evading state taxation, thereby leading to major revenue 
shortfalls.”
116
 While there could be haggling—at times, really fierce—on the size of the 
share that a particular group gets, but generally a consensus on the internalisation of 
struggle for a larger share prevails. Pakistani elites always like to play on “no holds 
barred” basis. They mount pressure on the polity’s policy formulation mechanics through 
back-door manipulation, lobbying, street-agitation, threat, strikes, and even violence, to 
achieve their economic agenda. They can even go to the extent of deforming and 
dismantling ruling coalitions and toppling governments if they perceive their economic 
interests to be in any kind of jeopardy—without much regard to the implications of their 
actions for the state; the masses—in combine with ignominious help from their foot-
soldiers—generalist lackeys.  
 
Elites’ Configuration 
Illustratively, the control of Pakistan’s economic polity by elites can be equated 
with a minority-held corporation, that is, an entity in which minority shares-holders 
(elites) control the management—say, Elites Ltd. The majority share-holders—the people 
of Pakistan—sit on the margins sans any say in the management and decision-making of 
the corporation. A minority management, in theoretical terms, tends to get into rent-
seeking, ad-hocist decision-making ignoring long-term sustainability imperatives and 
 
115Husain, Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State, 339. 
116Soofia Mumtaz, Jean-Luc Racine, and Imran Ali, Pakistan : The Contours of State and Society 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), xxiii. 
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attempting a reverse squeeze out
117
 on majority shareholders, a scenario that could 
potentially harm not only the silent majority but the corporation itself.
118
 The expected 
cumulative outcomes in terms of mismanagement arising from “minority control” of a 
corporation is almost comparable to the current state of affairs of Pakistan’s economy. 
What is the predictable intra-elites pattern of influence over body polity of 
Pakistan in historical context? The intra-elites shareholding in Elites Ltd., over time has 
been changing, influencing each group’s ability to lead, co-opt, and pressurise the ruling 
coalitions into exercising suboptimal policy choices particular in the arena of tax policy. 
Military elite have consistently held a major share in Elites Ltd. Their influence has seen 
ups and downs but they continue to play the single most dominant role in the polity. The 
riches that the military elite have amassed over time, the specific exemptions that their 
corporations got during various periods of history, the special reduced tax rates, the 
complicated corporate structures, the clandestinely contrived economic transactions,
119
 
and their defiance to submit to state authority in various realms of governance—
particularly fiscal policy—all bear vivid witness to their ability to maneuver public policy 
and pursue their economic agenda with focus and single-mindedness. Religious elite, 
although driven chiefly by an ideological worldview, have not been oblivious of 
ferociously pursuing and protecting their economic interests. A virtually non-existent 
fiscal regulatory regime for non-profits is not only their forte but also their biggest 
camouflaged gain in the struggle for economic power in Pakistan. Industrial elite and 
business elite have most of the times operated in with each other except with regards to 
rare issues like imposition of Value Added Tax (VAT) etc. Feudal elite have seen their 
importance in Elites Ltd nosedive over time but nonetheless they have been successful in 
holding on to their assets which necessarily appreciate in value with time leaving them in 
a permanently advantaged position. Their single most notable gain has been to keep 
agricultural real estate and incomes arising there from insulated from any effective 
taxation. Their ability to diversify and swap the sources of income has also reaped 
optimal gains in that they are able to report their taxable incomes tax-exempt by claiming 
them from agricultural sources. 
Sundry elite, a conglomerate of disparate sub-elite groups, that is, media elite—
electronic media outlet proprietors, TV talk-show anchors, print-media journalists and 
op-ed columnists; professional elite i.e. chartered accountants, independent consultants 
with varying professional backgrounds; judicial elite i.e. superior court judges and 
lawyers; and the so-called non-profit organisations (NPO) professionals, passionately 
grounded in their libertarian worldview, are a relatively new phenomenon, but with good 
ability to effectively protect their economic interests. An exceedingly lax fiscal regulatory 
regime in respect of all sub-groups of sundry elite being overly facilitative in an 
 
117In a plain sense, “squeeze out” refers to a situtation wherein majority share-holders look to eliminate 
minority shareholders from the business of the corporation or even the corporation itself. 
118David R. Meinster and Elyas Elyasiani, “The Performance of Foreign Owned, Minority Owned, and 
Holding Company Owned Banks in the U.S,” Journal of Banking and Finance 12, No. 2 (1988). 
119 While all interest incomes howsoever orginating undergo inevitable axe of withholding tax, retired 
servicemen have the luxury to invest in a clandestine Army Welfare Trust scheme the yeild of which does not 
attract any withholding tax at source. Tax departments' efforts to get access to particulars of investors with 
corresponding quantum of investments, and have at-source taxation enforced as in case of other ordinary 
citizens, spanning over past three decades have never even come close to a success. 
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international comparison is an evidence of the fact that sundry elite have exerted 
significant amount of influence on the polity in recent years. 
Media elite’s ability to have near-complete monopoly over the ways and means of 
influencing public opinion gives them unmatched access and intrusion into the policy-
making process i.e. by exerting pressure on the political structures. Their grit to take on a 
particular party, a group, or a government and cow it down through launching of frantic 
targeted campaigns speaks volumes about their recent rise and success. Understandably, 
there is absolutely no comparison between the quantum of business that the media 
industry generates annually and the collective revenue that it contributes to the national 
exchequer. Pakistani media elite, barring a few exceptions, betray a paradox in terms of 
their approach in that they are predominantly right-wing in a religious sense, and 
centrifugal in a political sense. They are perennially prone to sensationalisation,
120
 and 
tend to take a secretive, socially fissured, and politically torn polity as a gaming zone. 
Media elite, as a class, are more interested in political instability as it lays them 
tremendous financial gains, and as soon as the new political dispensation takes its seat, 
media elite move quickly to draw fresh battle-lines and starkly divergent positions—one 
section launching an outright servile campaign in favour of the government relishing on 
the induced government-spending on its image-building, and the other against the 
government cashing in on the opposition’s impatience to pull down the incumbent 
regime; either way, media’s group gains continue to soar with time. Although, Barney 
has pertinently argued that information revolution supported and sustained by 
technological advancements, more often than not, is attended by “an explosion of diverse 
means and practices for engaging in public life,” which, in turn, increases “the possibility 
of an invigorated and improved democratic politics,”
121
 the process does not appear to 
have set in Pakistan—at least, at the moment. 
Likewise, professional elite have their own particularistic gains to their credit to 
prove they have the requisite ability to influence both formulation and implementation of 
policy in the country. The mere fact that they are generally well-educated and 
professionally trained helps them conveniently penetrate into ruling structures and 
influence policy decisions.
122
 Professional elite’s ability to affect country’s public policy 
in their favor gets a boost by their ability to be hired by international organisations, 
bilateral socio-economic assistance arms of various developed countries to carry out 
various studies and write reports cross-cutting all arenas of governance.  Non-profit elite 
with close cooperation and support of religious elite have deftly guarded their turf and 
 
120There is evidence to indicate media elite's penchant to sensationaliaze and blow out of proportion any 
incident that would “sell,” and lose interest in it as soon as actual facts concerning it come to light. See, for 
instance, Usman Manzoor, “Media Mum over Murree Girl's Death Case,” The News, July 2, 2016. 
121Darin Barney, “Plitical Communication in Canada: The Revenge of Publicity,” Global Media 
Journal— Canadian Edition I, No. (1) (2008). 
122In 2013, one rare well-coordianted effort was made by FBR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Economic Affairs Division to engage UN system in Pakistan to extract information about salary and 
conslutancy incomes of their local employees and other consultants numbering about 500, who were not 
covered under the standard host-country exemption extended to qualified UN personnel, so as to enforce 
domestic tax laws on par with all other salaried taxpayers. Prolonged consultations, however, bore no fruit as 
under mounting internal pressure Douglas Hageman, Deputy Country Director, UNDP, chose not to divulge the 
critical information (FBR File No.F.3(32-A) Int.Taxes.05). One wonders if such brute informational iron-
curtaining would have been possible in any other country. 
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interests—including but not limited to—a completely dishevelled non-profits tax regime. 
Judicial elite, a perceptibly maverick-like phenomenon evolved and developed around the 
judicial activism initiated and carried forward by the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry. The judicial activism gained momentum on Justice Chaudhry’s removal by 
General Pervez Musharraf eventually transforming it into the so-called Lawyers’ 
Movement. Judicial elite now exhibit exceptionally potent force to influence public 
policy formulation in Pakistan in their favour. 
The capacity of an elite group to play a more dominant role than the other elite 
groups within Elites Ltd at different periods has had a direct correlation with (a) a 
group’s ability to organise, clamour and exert pressure on the ruling coalitions 
directly or indirectly, and (b) its achievements in terms of the economic gains which 
when ploughed back in, increase its capacity manifold to exert more pressure on the 
state for favourable policy choices that can facilitate above-par economic gains as 
well as those that can ensure holding on to the riches that have already been 
stockpiled. The six key values as pointed out by Hyden, et al. namely, participation, 
fairness, decency, accountability, transparency and efficiency,
123
 inter-relatedly 
undergrid quality and level of governance in a society. The perversely intra-elites 
wrangling for above-normal economic group gains undermines the very efforts of the 
state to perform its functions.    
 
Elites’ Policy Formulation Grid 
How do elites operate and mount pressure on the polity to manipulate the 
extractive system through coercing it into exercising sub-optimal policy choices, and 
weakening of its enforcement arms, can also be depicted pictorially. In the figure below 
the elites positioned in central column articulate their interests to the state through 
political parties (right column) as well as through their umbrella representative 
organisations (left column). Political parties and umbrella representative organisations 
further articulate their interests at governmental level where, in theoretical terms, national 
interest aggregation takes place. Since ruling coalitions are essentially composed of 
elites’ agents themselves, it does not take much (effort and time) reducing articulated 
interests into policy bits.  
Any resistance from a rival group, if at all, is either fleeting or put up for public 
consumption, is overcome through pressure tactics, that is, through threat of withdrawal 
of support for the ruling coalition, exit from the cooperative framework, or of resorting to 
strikes, street agitations, and even low-grade violence. Historically, cooperation has come 
to prevail at all times and in all situations. Finally, the so called aggregated national 
interest trickles down to the bureaucratic organisation, where policy directives are 
processed and formulated into implementable policy pronouncements. At tactical level, 
this is achieved with the all-willing help of a generalist lackey already placed as head of 
state’s extractive function. Intriguingly, elites perched in the state’s heart of policy 
formulation process get heard and rewarded—almost invariably.  
 
123J. Court G. Hyden, and K. Mease, Making Sense of Governance (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2004). 
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The grid further signifies that the elites control extractive function and successfully 
undertake to manipulate the tax policy through their generalist collaborators and 
conveniently shift fiscal burden from their own shoulders to those already marginalised 
and impoverished masses. The generalist cadres—lacking in skill and professional 
niche—enter into a symbiotic relationship with the elites through systematically 
orchestrated mutually self-serving transactional arrangements. The elites help the 
generalist mandarins monopolise important state institutions like FBR in return for 
favourable policies and their lax implementation. The end result of this symbiotic 
collusive elites-generalist relationship is that the entire fiscal policy formulation process 
is completely divorced from the citizenry of Pakistan.  
The state’s pronounced and exaggerated predilection to engage with only select 
factions, lends ears only to their interest articulation, and reflect only their demands in public 
policy outputs—leaving out the unorganised and marginalised millions—may be indicative of 
the fact that the state of Pakistan is in complete captivity, beholden to Elites Ltd. This is what 
Mushtaq Khan calls “political settlement (that) emerges when the distribution of benefits 
supported by its institutions is consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the 
economic and political outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time.”
124
 Jonathan 
et al, in the same vein, have argued that “Developing the capacity of the state to increase 
taxation is centrally determined by the balance of power, or political settlement, on which the 
state rests.
125
 A perversely contrived political settlement, as in the case of Pakistan, not only 
adversely impacts the masses but also their perception of the state, leading to further 




124M. Khan, “Political Settlements and Governance of the Growth-Enhancing Institutions—Working 
Paper,” ed. School of Asian and African Studies (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 2010), 1. 
125Jonathan Di John and James Putzel, “Political Settlements,” in Issue Papers (Birmingham: 
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2009), 13. 
126For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between state-building and extraction within the context 
of Pakistan, see Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan: State-Building, Extraction, and (Misplaced) Societal 
Preferences,” Journal of International Stability Studies 2, No. 1 (2016). 
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IV.  ELITES’ RATIONAL ACTOR DILEMMA 
The paper posits that the foremost tool and target of domination for Pakistani elites 
has been the state’s extractive system. This is simply because a functional extractive 
system—depending on both the base and the rate applicable—could, on the average, cost 
elites up to 40 percent of their riches on an on-going basis; it is a substantial chunk.
127
 
Moreover, a strong tax system is difficult to hijack to obtain engineered exemptions and 
amnesties. So, the extractive system’s domination becomes pivotal within the given 
framework of an elite-held captive state. This is where the elites get to confront a serious 
dilemma: they need to ensure protection of their riches but they also need a state to 
govern. Why would elites need a state to govern when the assumption is that they are not 
power hungry—megalomaniacs?
128
 This is for two reasons. Firstly, state structure—if 
they could control, is per se a source of power, which could then be remodeled and re-
employed to generate more riches. Secondly, prevailing pro-elite dispensation provides a 
robust certainty factor, which in an altered state-structure could not potentially be ensured 
and guaranteed. Now, sustaining of the state has a price-tag; it requires resources. Since 
elites have a vested interest in sustaining the state, and which is not possible without 
lining up definite amount of resources on an on-going basis; being rational actors they 
choose to sustain it at the least cost to themselves.
129
 
How then does the dilemma resolve itself? Or even does it? The elites venture to 
sustain the state for a conduit to amassing more wealth and underwriting already amassed 
wealth through two methods. Firstly, elitist state, should it be possible, prefers to extract 
internationally by selling whatever it could—security concerns, poverty, low human 
development indices, geo-strategic location, depleting natural resource base, degrading 
ecosystem, natural disasters, humanitarian crises, state-sponsored international mercenary 
services—to induce international rents-in-aid, grants, discount-credits, and even overly-
priced loans. Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict of 1980s, deploying military 
detachments in Middle Eastern sheikhdoms and its ever-readiness to offer military and 
police personnel for peace-keeping missions all over the globe under the UN umbrella are 
ostensible legitimate ploys of international extraction. The phenomenon is so embedded 
within the psyche of the polity, and wide-spread and grounded in its history that Pakistan 
could very well be called a rentier state of sorts.  
The seeds of this trend could be traced back to the very inception years of the 
Pakistani state. Jalal explicating Pakistan’s efforts in F/Y 1949-50 to generate the U.S. 
dollars to ensure uninterrupted purchases of defense-related hardware laconically 
observed: “This is why officials in the ministries of finance and commerce were busy 
working out strategies to increase Pakistan’s availability of dollars. They had begun 
learning the ropes of the international financial system even if in the process they 
neglected to refine the art of domestic economic management.”
130
 In the same vein, 
 
127In a standard manifestation, an adequately functional tax system's  impact could even be far more 
pinching when viewed in the context of proper application of Wealth Tax, Gift Tax, Estate Duty (Inheritance 
Tax), and Capital Gains Tax on real estate. 
128This point has been deliberated upon in the preceding section of the paper. 
129A “rational actor” is an agent who strategically weighs costs and benefits of alternative courses of 
action and chooses best course of action which is most likely to maximise his gains and utility. 
130Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule : The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence 
(Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 96. 
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Husain argues that “Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 propelled Pakistan to the 
forefront of international political attention,” and that “Not only did it give political 
legitimacy to a regime which was facing credibility problems of its own, it also set the 
way for substantial infusions of foreign aid and war-related assistance that 
would…provide a safety valve for the Pakistani economy.”
131
 Khan confirms the view 
that “Afghan war…increased the level of foreign aid.”
132
 Although the proportion of 
grants increased from around 12 percent in late 1970s to around 25 percent in 1980s, 
mainly because of food aid and other funds intended for Afghan refugees, yet most aid 
was in the form of loans. It is significant that till late 1980s, international lenders and 
donors did not have too significant a role in the policy formulation process in Pakistan. 
However, the crucial role of IMF started to become more and more visible within the 
mechanics of policy formulation after 1988, when Pakistan conveniently graduated to the 
position of a country heavily dependent on foreign assistance. The backdrop, of course, 
was the reduction of Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance in the wake of Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan that saw the era of rents-in-aid coming to an abrupt and 
being replaced by an epoch of lending-in-aid. 
Nonetheless, Pakistan has been at the forefront, and quite deftly too, always trying 
to diversify modes of international extraction, particularly, in harvesting international 
assistance under IDA and ADF soft windows of the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, respectively. It may, therefore, be not all that baseless if Pakistan’s 
public policy formulation process is generally regarded as donor-driven. Pakistan’s 
penchant for extraction at international level can, at times, take raw and bizarre turns. In 
2009, Government of Pakistan approached the Government of Kuwait to open a 
donation-seeking charity account therein in the Prime Minister’s own name for relief and 
rehabilitation of internally displaced persons uprooted because of the Swat operation 
launched against the terrorists.
133
 While effort was obviously aimed at harvesting Kuwaiti 
dinars over and above what Kuwaiti Government had officially committed, the request, 
per se, remained subject of varied interpretations. There is also a general perception that 
“most of the well-intended foreign aid is looted by corrupt governments and their 
politicians to fill their own personal coffers and hence augment their rule, and not to 
improve living conditions of all the citizens.”
134
 Resultantly, patterns of economic growth 
of Pakistan is a patent graphic representation of “boom-bust cycles, where foreign 
injections led to sharp upward spikes”
135
 but then since “resources were not channelled 
into high-impact investments, the GDP would plummet to a low equilibrium, where it 
stayed until the next round of conducive external facilitation.”
136
 It has also been argued 
“that foreign aid in Pakistan was negatively associated with the long run GDP growth in 
 
131Husain, Pakistan : The Economy of an Elitist State, 29. 
132Mohsin S. Khan in William E. James and Subroto Roy, eds., Foundations of Pakistan's Political 
Economy : Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (New Delhi; Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992), 175. 
133 Idrees Bakhtiar, “Relief Account in P.M's Name Arouses Suspicion,” Dawn, June 10 2011. 
134Somar Wijayadasa, “Good Bye to Foreign Aid,”  Z-Communications (2011), 
http://www.zcommunications.org/good-bye-to-foreign-aid-by-somar-wijayadasa. 
135GOP, “Pakistan: New Growth Framework,” ed. Planning Commission (Islamabad: Plannin 
Commission, 2011), 3. 
136Vaqar Ahmed and O'Donoghue, “Redistributive Effect of Personal Income Taxation in Pakistan,” 
Pakistan Economic and Social Review 47,  No. 1 (2009): 45. 
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the absence of macroeconomic fundamentals.”
137
 It has been argued, and not without 
good reason, that over-dependence on international extraction at the expense of domestic 




Secondly, since the international extraction is not possible indefinitely and without 
a definite degree of domestic resource-match, the elites compulsively need to undertake 
domestic extraction. Being rational actors they have to achieve it at the least cost to 
themselves. They achieve it through six modes. 
One, the elites effectively exploiting their control of tax policy formulation as 
explained earlier, get to introduce an elaborate indirect taxes system so as to shift the 
maximum revenue burden onto the unrepresented and already marginalised sections of 
the society. The polity’s proclivity to resort to indirect taxes to generate requisite amount 
of revenues from domestic sources has even been propagated by a number of reform 
initiatives instituted by Government over the past seven decades.
139
 It was argued that 
“The role of sales tax should be enlarged and the function of generating a very large 
proportion of revenue from indirect taxes should be assigned to the sales tax which 
should eventually move towards the direction of Value Added Tax.”
140
 Likewise, “In the 
context of the development programmes in Pakistan,” it was noted as far back as 1960, 
that “emphasis in the case of indirect taxes is being shifted…to central excises.”
141
 
Despite there being theoretical and empirically proven exhortations to the contrary, Elites 
Ltd has kept on pushing tax policy choices which suited them most and promoted their 
own economic agenda. Thus, it is not surprising if the indirect inland taxes coupled with 
the withholding-cum-presumptive taxes constitute about 80 percent of the total domestic 
resource base of the state. 
Two, the elites effectively transform the state’s direct taxes system into a 
quasi-direct one through the implantation of an extended withholding-cum-
presumptive tax regime thereby conveniently allowing their own liability to be 
transferred to the socio-economic sediments and in the process getting a brute legal 
protection against preparation and audit of their financial accounts, and even filing of 
annual tax returns. It goes without saying that a quasi-direct taxation can have 
spurious impact on the economy in the long run as it does carry definite potential to 
interfere negatively with the distribution of wealth and proper functioning of the 
market. Khan has argued that “introduction of presumptive taxes in all forms—fixed, 
minimum tax or withholding tax as discharge of final tax liabilities” doing “away 
with the requirement of filing of tax return,” and a “need to get registered with the 
 
137A. W. Farooq and Vaqar Ahmed, “Nexus between Aid and Security: The Case of Pakistan,” in 
Country Paper for Policy Reforms and Aid Effectiveness (Colombo: Institute of Policy Studies, 2010). 
138Raza Rumi, “Wikileaks and Pakistan's Dysfunctional State,” The Express Tribune, December, 3 
2010. 
139For an in-depth and elaborate analysis of all the tax reform commissions constituted so far and how 
those were elitist initiatives in their conception, formation, composition, proceedings, outputs and outcomes, see 
Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, “Elites, Extraction, and State Autonomy: Pakistan and U.S in Comparison,” Area 
Study Centre for Africa, North and South America (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 2015). 
140GOP, “The National Taxation Reform Commission Report (Part 1),” (Islamabad: Ministry of 
Finance, 1986), 164. 
141Abdur Rab, “Pakistan Taxation Enquiry Committee Report,” The Pakistan Development Review 2, 
No. 2 (1962): 203. 
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Tax Administration,” could have serious far-reaching implications for the country as 
“such a simplistic approach in the background, the Government’s efforts to build a 
comprehensive data base with the National Tax Number serving as the focal 
reference point may not materialise.”
142
 It was further argued that Government’s 
efforts in mopping up true revenue potential could, in the long run, come to naught, 
as once accustomed to a simple and generous tax regime, process would be difficult 
to reverse for determining accurate income for tax purposes.
143
 “Thus, the short-run 
gains in revenue, if any, will be more than offset by the huge revenue losses in 
future.”
144
 This is exactly what has happened. Extended withholding taxes regime 
with a PTR topping results in indiscriminate taxation as against targeted taxation, 
which is the hallmark of all good direct taxation. Indiscriminate taxation suits elites 
in a number of ways. It thwarts any chances of taxing various economic agents 
according to their true potential. Moreover, indiscriminate taxation propels and eggs 
economic agents in similar commercial conditions to form groups so as to be able to 
effectively articulate and protect their interests, a phenomenon that perpetuates the 
elitist operational paradigm and provides it with a moral justification. 
“Indiscriminate stepping up of tax rates with a view to raising the ratio of tax 
proceeds to G.N.P. can cause more harm than good and may even prove self-
defeating.”
145
 There is no doubt that PTR, apart from introducing a convenient under-
regulation into the overall management and governance of the country,  has also 
fomented “groupness” in almost all spheres of economic life. 
Three, the elites choose to shift to non-tax revenues when matching share of 
domestic revenues falls short of desired levels. It has been averred that the Government’s 
“inability to raise the overall tax-to-GDP ratio was compensated by surcharges from 
natural gas’ and petroleum products’ sales,” whereby the “highest contribution from 
surcharges at 2.49 percent of GDP came in FY1999 when the tax-to-GDP ratio was at its 
lowest at 10.48 percent.”
146
 In fact, non-tax revenues grew at a faster pace than tax 
revenues, that is, annually 15 and 14 percent in FY 1999-00 and in FY 2007-08, 
respectively, constituting about 1/3
rd
 of the total government revenues.
147
 Absence of a 
decent balance between the direct and the indirect taxes, an excessive withholding 
regime, and an aggressive imposition of “petroleum development surcharge pushed an 
overwhelming majority of Pakistanis towards, and a substantial number of them, below 
the poverty line.”
148
 The prevailing tax policy matrix and the resultant perverse tax-mix 
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may be clearly indicative of the state’s insensitivity to the rising poverty, soaring 
inflation, a distorted Gini-coefficient, a flatter Lorenz Curve, and an unsustainable fiscal 
deficit—but still insufficient to alarm Elites Ltd in their cozy comfort zone. 
Four, under an overwhelming domination of elites, the polity exhibits an 
ambiguous and pronounced tendency to promote charity not only under its own direct 
auspices, but also by keeping legal-cum-regulatory framework of charity-soliciting 
organisations lax and deficient for adventurers of all shades and hues. The exercise of 
such a policy has two distinct features: (a) At time of every crisis—big or small, natural 
or man-made–the state has scrambled to set up a charity account in the name of President 
or Prime Minister and heave an emotive appeal to the people for donations and 
contributions without realising that charities beg, states do not; states tax. (b) The non-
profits regulatory framework, be it in the sense of registration laws, recurring reporting 
requirements, or fiscal regime, has been kept too lax, flexible, and riddled with 
loopholes—by design. This way the elitist state was conveniently able to shift a good part 
of its functions and responsibilities of providing public goods like education, health, and 
human rights to charitable organisations. Thus, it is not surprising that libertarian forces 
under the influence of mis-guided and half-baked notions nurtured by the sundry (NPO) 
elite have taken strong roots in the society, promoting all kinds of extremist views on 
both sides of the divide, obfuscating national policies thereby snatching initiative from 
the government and undermining the writ of state. 
Five, the elitist state chooses to raise their loans to make up for the shortfalls in 
domestic extraction whereby elites are able to defer their tax payment indefinitely. The 
polity started resorting to this option full well from the very beginning as “Within a 
period of thirteen months between September 1948 and end of March of 1949, the 
Government of Pakistan were able to borrow about Rs 70 crores from the market, which 
may be contrasted with Rs 40 crores borrowed by the Government of India during the 
financial year 1949-50.”
149
 This gave traction to efforts on international extraction. 
“When the revenue expenditure gap increased in the early 1980s, authoritarian 
governments at the time did not apply restrictions on borrowing, rather signed hefty loan 
deals with the U.S. and IFIs, which were possible in the wake of Afghanistan crisis.”
150
 
The propensity to borrow without due diligence was not confined to international 
sources; domestic sources were exploited ruthlessly, too. It was noted as far back as 1960 
that “economy is burdened with a great deal of excess liquidity as a result of the 
unrestricted deficit resorted to by the previous governments.”
151
 The state’s demand for 
dimes from borrowed sources continues to remain insatiated even today. 
Six, for a last resort, the elitist state gets into extortion of no moral standing 
through multiple means. On each single occasion of national distress or calamity, a day or 
two’s salary is subtracted from the paycheck of all government servants; at times even 
three or four days salary has also been deducted. It is done through a simple notification 
issued by the executive. On the other hand, fiscally vibrant states, whenever required, 
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impose discriminate additional taxes on the persons who possess determinable capacity to 
pay on top of what they have already paid for the year. Likewise, extraction of money 
through National Accountability Bureau under “Plea bargain” mechanism, and 
indiscriminate collection of TV surcharge in utility (electricity) bills can be dubbed as 
direct extortion by the state. The advance Neelam-Jhelum (Hydropower Project) 
Surcharge is yet another trite example of state-sponsored extortion. It has been posited 
that none of the relevant laws provide for the imposition of a surcharge on an under-
construction power project.
152
 Although Article 77 of the Constitution provided that 
taxability was essentially to be determined by the legislature and that the executive 
authorities had no power to impose any such tax, and Article 157(2)(b) stipulating that a 
tax on consumption of electricity could only be imposed through a law and that too by a 
provincial assembly, clearly stand in the way of Neelam-Jhelum (Hydropower Project) 
Surcharge,
153
 yet the elitist state’s relentless insistence on imposition and collection could 
only be characterised as elitist state-sponsored extortion. 
Thus, not surprisingly, in the recent past, public policy debate, almost entirely, 
both in and outside Pakistan has primarily revolved around either introduction of VAT 
(or any of its variants) or maximisation of international extraction through an increase in 
aid, loans or even foreign remittances, and to a lesser degree, around the rest of the 
aforementioned modes of domestic resource match. The polity’s total silence with regard 
to the two well-established theories that (a) a sustained inflow of international resources 
crowds out domestic extraction, and (b) direct taxes are far more equitable than indirect 
taxes—is intriguing. More intriguing may be the silence of the populace—the victims of 
their own silence. Gramsci has argued that over time the ruling classes develop a 
hegemonic culture that invents and promotes its own values, which surreptitiously and 
imperceptibly become ‘common sense’ values for all. This way the ruling elites could 
control the cognitive abilities of the society whereby the working class starts to identify 
their own good with the good of the ruling class, and thus helps the latter maintain the 
status quo rather than dismantle it.
154
 One can perhaps read a lot of relevance in Gramsci 
for the present day Pakistan.  
 
V.  EQUILIBRIUM CONSENSUS SUBSISTENCE STATE 
This is where the plot thickens; First prong of the rational actor dilemma i.e. 
international extraction brings chickens home to roost. Understandably, since Pakistan 
has to survive not in isolation but in a geopolitical environment, it finds its international 
stakeholders having vested interest in it for multiple overt and covert reasons. The mere 
fact that international stakeholders dole out money to Pakistan regularly, gives them 
some sort of legitimacy to contribute to the its decision-making process—cost of its 
running being no exception. While internal stakeholders (elites) acting as rational actors 
choose to contribute the minimum possible and attempt to extract the rest (maximum) 
from international sources, the external stakeholder also acting as rational actors prefer to 
 
152The relevant laws, in this particular case, are the Electricty Act, 1910; the Water and Power 
Development Authority Act, 1858; and the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority Act, 1997. 
153Faisal Kamal Pasha, “Neelum-Jhelum Surcharge in Power Bills Challenged in I.H.C,” Dawn, 
November 23, 2014. 
154Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). 
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contribute the minimum, and exert pressure on the internal stakeholders to contribute the 
maximum by way of a domestic resource-match. Thus, Pakistan’s both internal and 
external stakeholders get into bargaining and transactions on an annual formula to line up 
enough resources to keep the state afloat. Soon the equilibrium point is achieved through 
transactional playoffs between competing actors at which each side is happy with the 
level of its contribution—though in a dynamic setting. 
 
Equilibrium Consensus Subsistence State 
 
 
The picture is a graphic representation of an equilibrium state depicting a 
consensus between internal and external stakeholders on contribution of each required to 
run it—not perhaps as a fully functional state but as a minimalist subsistence state. At the 
entry point, Elites Ltd wants to maximise on international extraction so that its 
contribution, i.e. domestic resource-match is minimal. In turn, the external rational actors 
also want to contribute the minimum and pressurise internal stakeholders to chip in the 
maximum. The equilibrium point is arrived at through gaming, bargaining, negotiations, 
and continuous engagements between the two competing rational actors. While on the 
one hand, it may now be understandable as to why Pakistan’s tax collection is 
consistently running between 8-9 percent of GDP, and domestic borrowing coupled with 
international resource inflows make do annual budgets—barely sufficient to perform its 
avowed functions as a state in an insufficient manner, and on the other, it may be 
indicative of a consensus between internal and external stakeholders that Pakistan has to 
be kept going as a state —but perhaps at a bare subsistence level.  
Although the elitist framework, as heretofore explicated culminating into 
equilibrium consensus subsistence state model, needs amplification through 
operationalisation and rigorous empirical testing, yet an irresistible question that flows 
out of the preceding debate is whether Pakistan is a rentier state? A state could be 
classified as rentier if (a) rents situations predominate; (b) the economy relies on 
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corresponding extractive function; (c) only a small proportion of the working population 
is actually involved in the generation and utilisation of rents; and (d) the state’s 
government is the principal recipient of external rents.
155
 It may, thus, not be coincidental 
and surprising that in Pakistan everything tends to be “international”—not so in substance 
as in nomenclature and denomination. Nomenclatures like Pakistan International 
Airlines, International Islamic University, Islamic International Medical Complex, and 
Multan International Airport, etc. may have something to do with the very psychic bent 
of the society which finds its moorings in international extraction. This trend is not 
limited to the public sector only; the private sector, non-profits and the clergy are also 
increasingly getting sucked into pseudo-internationalisation e.g. Shifa International 
Hospital, Quaid-i-Azam International Hospital, International Church of Karachi, 
International Islamic Relief, and International Gospel Mission Church etc. This is yet not 
all. Every other event in Pakistan of some or no semblance is international in style and 
nomenclature be it a flower, an arts, or a photography exhibition, a sports tournament, or 
a drama festival. It looks like that “becoming” international adds to legitimation and 
social acceptability of the entity or activity.  
The facts that Pakistan has been at the forefront of two proxy wars in its 
neighbourhood over the past three decades; it is the single largest contributor of army and 
police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions abroad; it is one of the top exporters of 
labour force—both legally and illegally, educated and uneducated, trained and untrained; 
it is dependent on foreign aid and loans; it assumes the role of an international watchman 
particularly in the Middle East; it chooses to keep its domestic extractive system 
dysfunctional; and that majorly its governments—by implication elitist clique that 
historically forms and deforms governments—have been prime beneficiary of all 
international extraction, renders it pretty much a rentier state. In this respect, 
Wallerstein’s influential World System Theory, adopting a multidisciplinary macro-
analytical approach to the study of world history and social change and taking the entire 
international state system as the unit of analysis as against the classes in Marxist and the 
nation-states in the classical and realist schools of thought, can beneficially be put to 
use.
156
 Wallerstein divides the world into core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states, and 
posits that while core states focus on highly skilled labour, capital-intensive production 
processes and sophisticated management controls, the production systems of semi-
peripheral and peripheral states are significantly dependent on unskilled labour, 
extraction of raw materials and labour-intensiveness,
157
 which technical advancement of 
the former (core country) production systems inevitably generates, secures and reinforces 
dominance of the peripheral world by the core world.
158
 The core-state-peripheral-state 
framework when applied to Pakistan with particular reference to the performance of its 
extractive function and its resultant over-dependence on external resources to minimally 
maintain itself not only galvanizes but also justifies its dubbing as an equilibrium 
consensus subsistence state.   
 
155Giacomo Luciani Hazem Beblawi, ed. The Rentier State, Vol. II, (Nation, State, and Integration in 
the Arab Word) (New York: Croom Helm, 1987). 
156Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 
157Ibid. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In all fairness, Neo-Marxist Structuralism, and to an extent, state-centric 
scholarship did illuminate the debate upfront, but eventually it is the Neo-Marxist 
Instrumentalism that fits Pakistan in terms of the elitist framework developed and 
elucidated in the preceding sections. It may be, in fact, Instrumentalism-plus that near-
fully captures phenomenon of the elite capture in Pakistan, which implies that the state of 
Pakistan is theoretically reducible to class act—contextually elites. When the status 
quo—system structure—is disaggregated into parts, that is, policy formulation processes 
with particular reference to state’s extractive system, one finds that the sub-system is 
thoroughly dominated and conveniently rigged by class-representing elites or their 
proxies—generalist bureaucratic cadres. Although the theoretical configuration of 
Pakistan’s elitist state as conceived in the paper is sufficiently empirical and elaborate, 
yet its further extension and build-up would certainly help define and explicate Pakistan 
with a greater degree of exactitude.  
One of the core reasons for governance under-supply could be under-extraction by 
the state feeding into under-performance of its other critical functions e.g. coercion, 
redistribution, regulation—and simply put, supply of necessary public goods like 
education, and health. In turn, under-extraction may have been caused by below-par 
policy prescriptions and deficient enforcement handles handed down to an incapacitated 
administrative structure for implementation, for which arrangement is further exacerbated 
by incriminating absence of a holistic national level information aggregation system—
sustained by Instrumentalism-plus unleashed with vengeance by an elite capture of an 
unparalleled intensity and gravity. What is obvious is that in Pakistan governance under-
supply on part of the civil government institutions created large swathe of strategic space 
to be readily filled up by non-governmental and non-state actors to scramble, fill-in the 
vacuum, and promote their own agenda—theocratic, fundamentalist, ultra-modernist, 
anarchist—on the people and the polity alike.  
Pakistan’s political leadership, in fact, could never really decide the “important 
question whether societies of men are really capable of establishing good government, or 
not.  From reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their 
political constitutions on accident and force.”
159
 Many countries have done that and many 
more are in the process of doing it. Illustratively, the U.S. political leadership, undertook 
a preemptive strike to co-opt factions and suck them into the system
160
 by providing them 
a channel of interest articulation
161
 and by assigning the state an elevated role of an 
ultimate arbiter of (supposedly) just economic order and a harmonious society. Such 
rigorous reflection and its actualisation in the arena of state-building and governance, 
unfortunately, did not occur in Pakistan. The elite capture model does indicate that 
Pakistan may no more be an autonomous state; nor even a relatively autonomous state—
it may never have been; hence, a captive state. Pakistan’s political oligarchs may have 
missed the bus to streamline and legally authorise the role of factions and groups in the 
polity by providing a system-sanctioned mechanism of transparent and across-the-board 
interaction between homogenous sectional clientele into which the society divides itself 
 
159Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist Papers. 
160See, for instance, ibid. 
161The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. 
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and the government-sponsored politico-bureaucratic channels for above par policy 
outputs. The strategic vacuum so created induced a scramble for the state to be taken over 
that stands taken over full well as far as its extractive function is concerned. 
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